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Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve LLC v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 2026 WL 84544 (Bk.S.D.N.Y., Jan. 12, 2026).

(:description Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve LLC v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 2026 WL 84544 (Bk.S.D.N.Y., Jan. 12, 2026). )
Opinion 2026 Bankrutpcy Compliance Lien Opinion2026RadianceCapitalCampbellContemptBankruptyLiens

AI Synopsis

♦ The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York addressed cross-motions for summary judgment in an adversary proceeding concerning the dischargeability of debts. Radiance Capital, holding a judgment against Debtor John Campbell, had previously obtained Charging Orders in Alabama requiring Campbell’s limited liability companies (LLCs) to pay distributions directly to Radiance. Instead, Campbell diverted funds from his LLCs, specifically Whigham Place, to himself and other controlled entities for personal use. Radiance sought to have the debt declared nondischargeable. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Debtor on Count I, dismissing the claim for "actual fraud" under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Relying on Eleventh Circuit precedent, the Court held that the underlying debt was a standard loan breach not obtained by fraud, and the subsequent fraudulent transfers did not create a new, separate fraud debt. However, the Court ruled in favor of Radiance on Count II under § 523(a)(6). It found that Campbell’s knowing violations of the Charging Orders constituted "willful and malicious injury." Therefore, any monetary sanctions arising from these violations are nondischargeable. The Court sua sponte modified the automatic stay to permit the Alabama District Court to adjudicate the pending contempt motion and determine the specific sanction amount. Finally, regarding Count III, the Court issued a declaratory judgment that the liens created by the Charging Orders remain valid and survive the bankruptcy discharge. The Court rejected Campbell’s defenses regarding superior IRS liens and waiver, noting his failure to appeal the original orders or report transfers. ♦

Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve LLC v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 2026 WL 84544 (Bk.S.D.N.Y., Jan. 12, 2026).

United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York.

IN RE: John F. CAMPBELL, Debtor.

Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve LLC, Plaintiff,

John F. Campbell, Defendant.

Case No. 23-35668 (KYP)

Adv. Pro. No. 24-09009 (KYP)

Signed January 12, 2026

Attorneys and Law Firms

JOHN F. CAMPBELL, Pro Se Defendant, 60 Campbell Road, Livingston Manor, NY 12758

MAPLES & FONTENOT, LLP, Counsel to Plaintiff, P.O. Box 1281, Mobile, AL 36633, By: Gilbert Larose Fontenot, Esq., Of Counsel

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER (I) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (II) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (III) MODIFYING THE AUTOMATIC STAY TO ALLOW PROSECUTION OF THE SANCTIONS MOTION

HONORABLE KYU YOUNG PAEK, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

PAGE_1

In October 2013 and January 2014, the predecessor to judgment-creditor Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve LLC ("Radiance Capital") obtained the entry of charging orders (together, the "Charging Orders") granting it liens on John F. Campbell's ("Debtor") interest in numerous limited liability companies (collectively, the "LLCs"). Akin to garnishment orders, the Charging Orders required the LLCs to make distributions to Radiance Capital that would otherwise be payable to the Debtor until Radiance Capital's money judgment was paid in full.

The LLCs have not made a single payment under the Charging Orders. Instead, the LLCs – and one LLC in particular, Whigham Place Property Management, LLC ("Whigham Place") – made dozens of payments in violation of the Charging Orders directly to the Debtor or for the Debtor's benefit. In 2023, Radiance Capital moved in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ("Alabama District Court") for sanctions against the Debtor citing numerous violations of the Charging Orders, and the Debtor responded by filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in this Court.

In this adversary proceeding, Radiance Capital seeks, among other things, a determination that certain debts owed to it are nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Radiance Capital and the Debtor have now each moved for summary judgment ("Radiance Capital Motion" fn1 and "Debtor Motion," fn2 and together, the "Motions") and filed opposition to the other side's motion. fn3

fn1.

See Radiance's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated July 29, 2025 ("Radiance Brief") (ECF Doc. # 84), and Radiance's Reply to Campbell's Response to Radiance's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated Aug. 19, 2025 ("Radiance Reply") (ECF Doc. # 96). "ECF Doc. # _" refers to documents filed on the electronic docket of this adversary proceeding. "ECF Main Case Doc. # _" refers to documents filed on the electronic docket of the Debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. References to documents filed on other dockets will include the case name or case number. "ECF p. _" refers to the page number imprinted across the top of the page by the Court's electronic filing system.

fn2.

See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, docketed on July 29, 2025 ("Debtor Brief") (ECF Doc. # 85), and Defendant's Surreply, docketed on Aug. 19, 2025 ("Debtor Reply") (ECF Doc. # 98).

fn3.

See Radiance's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Campbell's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated Aug. 12, 2025 ("Radiance Opposition") (ECF Doc. # 90), and Defendant's Rebuttal of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, docketed on Aug. 12, 2025 ("Debtor Opposition") (ECF Doc. # 89").

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that any monetary sanctions owed to Radiance Capital stemming from Debtor's multiple violations of the Charging Orders are nondischargeable as debts for "willful and malicious injury" under section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. However, the Alabama District Court – as the court that issued the Charging Orders – is the appropriate court with jurisdiction to issue a contempt order and determine monetary sanctions against the Debtor. Therefore, the Court will modify the automatic stay to allow Radiance Capital to continue prosecution of the Sanctions Motion (defined infra) in the Alabama District Court.

JURISDICTION

PAGE_2

This Court has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the Amended Standing Order of Reference (M-431), dated January 31, 2012 (Preska, C.J.) referring bankruptcy cases and proceedings to the Bankruptcy Judges of the Southern District of New York. The issues presented by the Motions are core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) and (K). This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over nondischargeability claims brought under section 523(a)(2), (4), and (6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Busche v. Grover (In re Grover), 667 B.R. 243, 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2025) (citation omitted); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007 advisory committee's note to subdivision (c) ("The bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine dischargeability [under section 523(a)(2), (4) or (6)]. If a complaint is not timely filed, the debt is discharged. See § 523(c)."). fn4

fn4.

Section 523(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "the debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such debt to be excepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4) or (6), as the case may be, of subsection (a) of this section." Federal Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), in turn, requires that "a complaint to determine whether a debt is dischargeable under § 523(c) must be filed within 60 days after the first date set for the § 341(a) meeting of creditors."

BACKGROUND fn5

fn5.

The Court has reviewed the following documents submitted with the Motions:

• Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts Under Local Bankruptcy Rule 7056-1, dated July 29, 2025 ("Radiance Fact Statement") (ECF Doc. 83) and exhibits appended thereto;

• Declaration of Jody Burleigh in Support of Summary Judgment, dated July 29, 2025 ("Burleigh Declaration") (ECF Doc. # 83-32);

• Affidavit of Gilbert L. Fontenot, dated Aug. 12, 2025 ("Fontenot Affidavit") (ECF Doc. # 91) and exhibits appended thereto;

• Debtor's Statement of Material Facts, docketed on July 29, 2025 ("Debtor Fact Statement") (ECF Doc. # 85 at ECF pp. 14-15) and exhibits appended thereto;

• Plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Facts in Opposition to Campbell's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated Aug. 12, 2025 ("Radiance Fact Response") (ECF Doc. # 92) and exhibits appended thereto;

• Disputed Facts Presented by Plaintiff, docketed on Aug. 12, 2025 ("Debtor Fact Response") (ECF Doc. # 89 at ECF p. 16) and exhibits appended thereto (exhibit 5 was docketed at ECF Doc. # 93); and

• Exhibits appended to the Radiance Opposition, Radiance Reply, and Debtor Reply.

This section includes references to judicial documents and court records filed on dockets of other cases. The Court may take judicial notice of such documents and records. In re Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 29 F. Supp. 3d 345, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); accord In re Mehl, 660 B.R. 353, 359 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2024); see Fed. R. Evid. 201.

A. The Alabama Action and the Charging Orders

On or about May 22, 2007, the Debtor borrowed $305,000.00 from Vision Bank secured by a mortgage on certain non-homestead real property. fn6 The Debtor subsequently defaulted on the note. On April 23, 2013, SE Property Holdings, LLC ("SEPH"), as successor by merger with Vision Bank, commenced an action in the Alabama District Court captioned SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, Civil Action No. 13-238 ("Alabama Action") seeking repayment of the outstanding amount. (ECF Alabama Action Doc. # 1 (complaint in Alabama Action).) SEPH moved for summary judgment, and the Alabama District Court granted SEPH's motion on September 9, 2013. (ECF Alabama Action Doc. # 18 (summary judgment order).) On the same day, the Alabama District Court entered a corresponding Final Judgment ("Judgment") (ECF Alabama Action Doc. # 19) requiring the Debtor to pay SEPH $317,135.00.

fn6.

Copies of the note and mortgage are appended to the Radiance Fact Statement as Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively.

To facilitate payment of the Judgment, SEPH moved for entry of an order charging the Debtor's financial interest in certain limited liability companies (i.e., the LLCs), and the Alabama District Court granted SEPH's motion by entering the Charging Order Against John F. Campbell on October 21, 2013 ("First Charging Order") (ECF Alabama Action Doc. # 23). The First Charging Order required the charged LLCs to make distributions to SEPH that would otherwise be payable to the Debtor as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that a lien is charged against the financial interests of [the Debtor] in the [LLCs] in the amount of $317,135.00, being the final judgment of September 9, 2013, rendered in favor of [SEPH] and against [the Debtor], plus accrued interest and costs, and that [the LLCs] are Ordered to distribute to [SEPH] any income, officer's fees, bonuses, distributions, salaries or dividends paid or otherwise conveyed to [the Debtor] by reason of any interest he owns in the [LLCs] until [SEPH] is satisfied in full.

(First Charging Order at 1-2.) The First Charging Order further required the LLCs to notify SEPH each time a distribution subject to the order was made. (Id. at 2.)

On January 21, 2014, SEPH moved for a second order charging the Debtor's interests in additional LLCs, and the Alabama District Court granted SEPH's motion by entering the Second Charging Order Against John F. Campbell on January 21, 2014 ("Second Charging Order") (ECF Alabama Action Doc. # 40), which was substantively identical to the First Charging Order.7

fn7.

The LLCs subject to the Charging Orders are: Whigham Place; RE Management, LLC; 101 Webster Circle Property Management, LLC; Jackson Street Property Management, LLC; FP Management, LLC; Slidell Property Management, LLC; Salt Pond Investments Limited; DineroMax S.A. de C.V.; Credit Suisse First Boston Fund Investment, 1997, LP; Murray Oregon Equities, LLC; Sierra Development, LLC; Antilles Capital, LLC; Antilles GP, LLC; Antilles Investors, LP; Antilles Offshore Investors, Ltd; Antilles Intermediate LP; and Antilles Master Fund, LP. (First Charging Order at 1; Second Charging Order at 1.)

On December 20, 2018, SEPH assigned the Judgment to Radiance Capital, fn8 and, on November 20, 2020, Radiance Capital replaced SEPH as plaintiff in the Alabama Action. (ECF Alabama Action Doc. # 47 (order granting motion to substitute party).)

fn8.

The bill of sale evidencing the assignment is appended to the Radiance Fact Statement as Exhibit 13.

To date, none of the LLCs have reported any distributions as being subject to the Charging Orders, no payments have been made by any LLC to SEPH or Radiance Capital, and the Debtor remains indebted to Radiance Capital for the entire Judgment. (Burleigh Declaration ¶¶ 19, 21.)

B. Transfers From the LLCs

Between June 2017 and December 2022, two LLCs – Whigham Place and Antilles GP, LLC ("Antilles GP") – made the following thirty-five (35) distributions that, according to Radiance Capital, violated the Charging Orders:

Tabular or graphic material set at this point is not displayable.

(See Radiance Fact Statement, Exs. 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 28, and 29 (exhibits containing payment summaries, copies of checks, and wire receipts).) fn9

fn9.

Radiance Capital's summaries of the transfers effectuated by check (included in the exhibits) list dates that are a few days after the dates written on the checks themselves. The Court assumes that the dates on Radiance Capital's summaries reflect the dates in which the funds were received by the transferee's account.

The Court will describe the transferors and transferees in the sections that follow.

1. The Transferors

a. Whigham Place

All but one of the transfers at issue were made by Whigham Place, an LLC subject to the First Charging Order. (First Charging Order at 1.) Whigham Place is an Alabamabased LLC that owns a commercial building in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. (See Deposition of John F. Campbell, dated Feb. 15, 2024 ("Debtor Deposition") at 11:17-23; fn10 Radiance Fact Statement, Ex. 15 (Alabama Secretary of State business record for Whigham Place).) Whigham Place generated rental income of $296,904.00 and $350,886.00 in 2019 and 2020, respectively, from leasing its commercial building. (Radiance Fact Statement, Ex. 22 (excerpts of the Debtor's 2019 and 2020 tax returns).)

fn10.

The parties submitted excerpts of the Debtor Deposition in multiple filings in connection with the Motions including Exhibit 25 to the Radiance Fact Statement, Exhibit 1 to the Debtor Fact Statement, Exhibit 1 to the Radiance Fact Response, and Exhibit 1 to the Radiance Opposition.

The parties dispute whether Whigham Place is wholly owned by the Debtor himself, or an entity called Clairise Court LLC ("Clairise Court"), the latter being an entity wholly owned by the Debtor. (See Debtor's Schedule A/B: Property ("Property Schedule"), Part 4, Question 19 (ECF Main Case Doc. # 7 at ECF p. 6).) On the one hand, the Debtor's bankruptcy schedule submitted on August 25, 2023 listed the Debtor as the sole member of Whigham Place (id.), a financial statement signed by the Debtor represented that he wholly owned Whigham Place as of June 30, 2021 (Radiance Fact Response, Ex. 4 (financial statement)), and the Alabama Secretary of State website shows that the Debtor is the sole member of Whigham Place. (Id., Ex. 6 (Alabama Secretary of State printout for Whigham Place).) On the other hand, the Debtor provided a copy of a document showing that, effective March 1, 2020, he transferred his interest in Whigham Place to Clairise Court. (Debtor Fact Response, Ex. 2 (copy of assignment).) fn11 Ultimately, whether the Debtor made the transfers directly through his ownership of Whigham Place, or indirectly through his ownership of Clairise Court, has no bearing on the outcome of the Motions.

fn11.

Radiance Capital points out that no consideration was exchanged for the assignment. (Debtor Deposition at 8:4-13.) The Debtor responds that no consideration was exchanged because Whigham Place was insolvent at the time of the assignment. (Debtor Opposition ¶ 10.)

b. Antilles GP

PAGE_5

One of the transfers at issue was made by Antilles GP, a Delaware LLC formed in 2013. (Debtor Fact Response, Ex. 3 (Antilles GP certificate of formation).) fn12 The Debtor is the sole member of Antilles GP (see Property Schedule, Part 4, Question 19), and Antilles GP ceased business operations in 2016. (See Statement of Financial Affairs ("SOFA"), Part 11, Question 27 (ECF Main Case Doc. # 7 at ECF p. 25).)

fn12.

The Debtor asserts that Radiance Capital failed to disclose to the Alabama District Court that many of the LLCs were non-Alabama entities. (Debtor Fact Statement ¶ 6.) This assertion is false. Radiance Capital's predecessor, SEPH, disclosed this fact in each motion corresponding to the Charging Orders. (See Application For Charging Order Against John F. Campbell, dated Oct. 14, 2013 ¶ 5 ("Although a few of the [LLCs] to be charged are not Alabama entities, this Court has jurisdiction over [the Debtor's] interest in the [LLCs], and the Statute does not require that the [LLCs] be made a party to an action seeking such an order.") (ECF Alabama Action Doc. # 22); Second Application For Charging Order Against John F. Campbell, dated Jan. 10, 2014 ¶ 6 ("Although the [LLCs] to be charged are not Alabama entities, this Court has jurisdiction over [the Debtor's] interest in his [LLCs] and the Statute does not require that the [LLCs] be made a party to an action seeking such an order.") (ECF Alabama Action Doc. # 37).) The Debtor did not object to either motion, nor did he appeal either Charging Order.

2. The Transferees and the Transfers at Issue

a. Transfers to the Debtor

Twelve of the transfers listed in the above chart were made from Whigham Place directly to the Debtor. The Debtor confirmed that he received these distributions from Whigham Place. (Debtor Deposition at 39:18-40:1.) Although he wholly owns Whigham Place (either directly or indirectly through his ownership of Clairise Court), the Debtor was not an employee of Whigham Place. fn13

fn13.

On his bankruptcy schedule filed in August 2023, the Debtor represented that he is employed as a contractor with Able Builders LLC (another entity wholly owned by the Debtor described infra) earning gross monthly wages of $11,500.00. (See Schedule I ("Income Schedule"), Parts 1 and 2 (ECF Main Case Doc. # 7 at ECF pp. 14-15).) He also represented that he has been employed by Able Builders LLC for eight years prior to his August 2023 bankruptcy filing. (Id., Part 1, Question 1.) Despite that representation, the Debtor's 2019 and 2020 tax returns did not show any income from Able Builders LLC. (See Radiance Fact Statement, Ex. 22 (excerpts of Debtor's 2019 and 2020 tax returns).) Instead, the Debtor represented to the IRS that he was employed by Clairise Court in those years and earned a total income of only $1,250.00 in 2019 and $2,750.00 in 2020 from Clairise Court. (Id.)

b. Transfers to Clairise Court

Eight of the transfers listed in the above chart were made from Whigham Place to Clairise Court. As stated above, Clairise Court is an entity wholly owned by the Debtor. Whigham Place has no loan agreement with Clairise Court. (Debtor Deposition at 12:6-9.) Whigham Place has no ownership interest in Clairise Court. (Id. at 15:16-21.) When asked why he transferred funds from Whigham Place to Clairise Court, the Debtor testified that he was transferring amounts he would have otherwise taken as salary:

PAGE_6

Q. Why would [Whigham Place] be making a capital contribution to Clairise Court?

A. Well, I took money that otherwise I would have paid myself a salary and I contributed it to Clairise Court.

...

Q. Instead of taking money out of Whigham Place, putting it into one of your accounts, personal accounts, and then paying it then to Clairise, you just paid it straight from Whigham to Clairise. Is that what you're saying?

A. Yes.

(Debtor Deposition at 16:3-20.)

c. Transfers to WB Property

Nine of the transfers listed in the above chart were made from Whigham Place to WB Property Management LLC ("WB Property"). fn14 WB Property is wholly owned by the Debtor. (Property Schedule, Part 4, Question 19.) WB Property performs no business function and generates no income. (Debtor Deposition at 24:1-12.) Whigham Place has no loan agreement with WB Property. (Id. at 12:6-9.) Whigham Place has no ownership interest in WB Property. (Id. at 15:16-21.)

fn14.

There was some discussion during the Debtor's deposition that there were, at one point, two "WB Property" entities owned by the Debtor – one based in Alabama and another in Louisiana. (See Debtor Deposition at 20:2-23:5.) The Alabama entity eventually ceased to exist. (Id.) The Court assumes that the transfers to WB Property were made into an account held by the Louisiana entity.

At his deposition, the Debtor testified that he used WB Property's bank account "as a personal checking account." (Id. at 23:9-10.) Thus, the proceeds from the transfers to WB Property listed in the above chart were used to cover the Debtor's living expenses. (See id. at 26:16-21, 27:9-21, 28:20-29:18.)

d. Transfer to Able Builders

One of the transfers listed in the above chart was made from Whigham Place to Able Builders, LLC ("Able Builders"). Able Builders is wholly owned by the Debtor. (Property Schedule, Part 4, Question 19.) According to the Debtor's bankruptcy schedule, he works as a contractor for Able Builders. (Income Schedule, Parts 1 and 2.) Able Builders obtained a Louisiana contractor's license in 2015, but that license lapsed, and it is currently not licensed to perform contractor work. (Debtor Deposition at 31:16-32:7.) Whigham Place has no loan agreement with Able Builders. (Id. at 12:6-9.) Whigham Place has no ownership interest in Able Builders. (Id. at 15:16-21.)

When asked why he transferred $40,000.00 from Whigham Place to Able Builders, the Debtor testified that he was transferring amounts he would have otherwise taken as salary from Whigham Place:

Q. Why did Whigham Place write a check to Able Builders for forty thousand dollars?

A. It was an accumulation of salary I'd been paying myself from Whigham.

Q. Okay. So instead of taking a salary directly into one of your accounts, you just paid it straight to Able Builders; is that correct?

A. Yes.

(Debtor Deposition at 32:8-16.)

e. Transfer to Marina Campbell

One of the transfers listed in the above chart was made from Antilles GP to Marina Campbell ("Marina"). Marina is the Debtor's ex-spouse. (See SOFA, Part 4 (listing a completed divorce action).) In his brief opposing the Radiance Capital Motion, the Debtor described the circumstances leading to the June 2017 transfer to Marina:

PAGE_7

[Antilles GP] returned capital in the amount of $35,508.73 to [the Debtor] in June 2017 which he then sent to his estranged wife ...; the payment was a return of the investment [the Debtor] made in 2013 in a hedge fund he set up and in which [Antilles GP] was the general partner.

(Debtor Opposition ¶ 16.)

f. Transfers to JP Morgan

Four of the transfers listed in the above chart were made from Whigham Place to JP Morgan Chase ("JP Morgan"). These transfers paid balances owed on three credit card accounts held in the name of "John F. Campbell Clairise Court LLC." (See Radiance Fact Statement, Ex. 24 (JP Morgan credit card statements).) The Debtor claims that he is not personally liable for the JP Morgan accounts, and instead, these debts were owed by Clairise Court. (Debtor Fact Response at 1.) Whether the credit card balances were owed by the Debtor or Clairise Court (or both of them), a review of the credit card statements indicates that the Debtor used the credit cards on an almost daily basis to cover all manner of expenses, including his personal expenses. (See Radiance Reply, Exs. A, B, and C (credit cards statements).) The expenses included routine charges (i) at gas stations, (ii) at grocery stores, (iii) for subscription services (Spotify, Hulu, Netflix, Prime Video), (iv) for newspaper subscriptions (Wall Street Journal, The Epoch Times), (v) at restaurants, (vi) with internet vendors (Amazon, eBay), (vii) at hardware stores, and (viii) at auto parts stores. (See id.) The statements also showed certain charges to pay attorney's fees including, as Radiance Capital points out (see Radiance Reply at 8), an attorney who specializes in divorce proceedings.

C. Pre-2018 Transfers

The record created by the instant Motions focuses, for the most part, on transfers from Whigham Place made during 2018 and thereafter. However, in its motion for sanctions against the Debtor pending in Alabama District Court (described infra), Radiance Capital included numerous pre-2018 transfers from Whigham Place that were made following the entry of the Charging Orders. (See Motion for Sanctions Against John F. Campbell for Violating Charging Order, dated June 29, 2023 ¶ 14 ("Sanctions Motion") ("As evidenced by the records from Whigham Place's account at Marion Bank, from the date of the entry of the charging order on October 21, 2013, to December 5, 2022, approximately $725,296.45 has been distributed directly and indirectly to [the Debtor].") (ECF Alabama Action Doc. # 65); see, e.g., id., Ex. H.2 (showing forty pre-2018 transfers from Whigham Place's bank account directly to the Debtor by wire, check, or bank withdrawal).)

D. The Sanctions Motion and the Bankruptcy Filing

On June 29, 2023, Radiance Capital filed its Sanctions Motion in the Alabama Action requesting that the Alabama District Court hold the Debtor in contempt for his transfers totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars from Whigham Place in violation of the First Charging Order. (See Sanctions Motion.) The Alabama District Court entered a scheduling order requiring the Debtor to file a response to the Sanctions Motion by July 24, 2023, and subsequently extended such deadline to August 11, 2023. (See ECF Alabama Action Doc. ## 66, 78.) The Debtor did not file a response to the Sanctions Motion, and instead, filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in this Court on August 11, 2023. (ECF Main Case Doc. # 1.) The Alabama Action and the Sanctions Motion were stayed by the Debtor's bankruptcy filing. (ECF Alabama Action Doc. # 91 (order staying Alabama Action and requiring parties to apprise the Alabama District Court when the bankruptcy matter is concluded or relief from the automatic stay is obtained).)

E. This Adversary Proceeding

PAGE_8

On March 5, 2024, Radiance Capital commenced the instant adversary proceeding against the Debtor by filing its Adversary Complaint ("Complaint") (ECF Doc. # 1). The Complaint's allegations largely tracked the facts set forth herein and asserted three causes of action. First, Radiance Capital alleges that the Debtor engaged in a fraudulent scheme to transfer assets in violation of the Charging Orders for his own use. As a result, Radiance Capital has a claim under Alabama fraudulent transfer law against the Debtor (separate from the Judgment debt), and such claim is excepted from discharge as a debt for money obtained by "actual fraud" under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). (Complaint ¶¶ 51-55 ("Count I").) Second, Radiance Capital alleges that the Debtor's intentional violation of the Charging Orders resulted in a "willful and malicious injury" to Radiance Capital within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). (Id. ¶¶ 56-62 ("Count II").) Third, Radiance Capital seeks a declaratory judgment that it has a perfected security interest under the Charging Orders, which survive the bankruptcy discharge. (Id. ¶¶ 63-68 ("Count III").) fn15

fn15.

Count III included additional requests for declaratory judgment, but in its briefs and at oral argument, counsel for Radiance Capital confirmed that it is only seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the effect of the bankruptcy discharge on the Charging Orders. (See Transcript of Aug. 25, 2025 Hr'g at 9:16-10:3, 29:7-16 ("MR. FONTENOT: We may have included a request for monetary. We're not asking for that. I don't think the law supports it. So, it's strictly a ruling that these Charging Orders are valid.... THE COURT: So, it's only for finding that these Charging Orders are valid and survive bankruptcy[?] ... MR. FONTENOT: Correct.") (ECF Doc. # 107).)

The parties fully briefed both Motions, the Court heard oral argument on August 28, 2025, and took the matter under advisement.

DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable hereto pursuant to Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Bustamante v. KIND, LLC, 100 F.4th 419, 432 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Souza v. Exotic Island Enters., Inc., 68 F.4th 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2023)). "A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and an issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Ramos v. Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc., 687 F.3d 554, 558 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River-Black River Regulating Dist., 673 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir. 2012)).

Once the movant has carried its initial burden, "the nonmovant must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Bustamante, 100 F.4th at 432 (citation omitted). When deciding whether a genuine dispute exists as to a material fact, all ambiguities must be resolved, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn, in favor of the nonmoving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651, 657, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam). However, "[c]onclusory allegations, conjecture, and speculation are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact." Shannon v. New York City Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998)) (alteration omitted); accord Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (When the moving party has carried its burden, "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.").

When both parties move for summary judgment, "each party's motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration." Morales v. Quintel Ent., Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). "However, where the motion and cross-motion seek a determination of the same issue, the Court may address them together." Jackson v. Harvest Cap. Credit Corp., No. 17 Civ. 5276 (JFK), 2020 WL 705084, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2020), aff'd, 848 F. App'x 455 (2d Cir. 2021). Here, the Radiance Capital Motion and the Debtor Motion seek determination of the same issue: whether the Court may grant judgment on any of the three Counts in the Complaint as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court will address the Motions together.

B. Exceptions to Discharge Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)

PAGE_9

Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code enumerates twenty categories of debts that are excepted from an individual debtor's bankruptcy discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) – (20). The exceptions to discharge are "narrowly construed," and the creditor bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the debt is nondischargeable. Cazenovia Coll. v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw), 222 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2000). Counts I and II invoke the exceptions set forth in subsections (a)(2)(A) and (a)(6). Whether judgment may be granted as to either Count as a matter of law is addressed in the sections that follow.

C. Count I – "Actual Fraud" Exception Under Section 523(a)(2)(A)

Section 523(a)(2)(A) exempts from an individual debtor's bankruptcy discharge, among other things, "any debt ... for money ... to the extent obtained by ... actual fraud ...." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Courts typically rely on the common law of torts when analyzing "actual fraud" under section 523(a)(2)(A). Sharmat v. Gallen (In re Gallen), 559 B.R. 349, 356 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). As stated, Radiance Capital argues that the Debtor's transfer of funds violated Alabama fraudulent transfer law and gave rise to a debt owed to Radiance Capital, separate from the Judgment, that is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). (See Complaint ¶ 55 ("[The Debtor's] actual fraud in connection with receiving these fraudulent transfers created a new debt separate from [Radiance Capital's] underlying [Judgment] against [the Debtor] and is an exception to discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).").)

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Gaddy (In re Gaddy), 977 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 2020) ("Gaddy"), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 2514, 209 L.Ed.2d 548 (2021) addressed circumstances analogous to those present in the current case. The debtor in Gaddy ("Gaddy") was a guarantor of loans to fund an Alabama real estate development project. Id. at 1054. The project ran into financial trouble, and Gaddy received a letter from the lender warning of a potential default. Id. Upon receipt of that letter, Gaddy began transferring his assets to family members and entities he controlled. Id. The creditor – SEPH fn16 – sued Gaddy (and others) and obtained a $9.1 million judgment against Gaddy. Id. Gaddy filed bankruptcy, and SEPH commenced an adversary proceeding seeking a determination that its judgment debt was exempt from discharge as a debt for money obtained by actual fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and a debt for willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Id. Gaddy filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Bankruptcy Court granted Gaddy's motion, and the District Court affirmed the dismissal. Id. at 1055.

fn16.

The predecessor to Radiance Capital in the instant matter – SEPH – was a party in several decisions relevant to the instant ruling.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions. On the section 523(a)(2)(A) nondischargeability claim, the court of appeals focused on the statutory requirement that the debt subject to the nondischargeability claim must be "obtained by" actual fraud. Id. at 1056 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)); see also id. ("That is, it prevents discharge of any debt respecting money, property, services, or ... credit that the debtor has fraudulently obtained.") (quoting Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 218, 118 S.Ct. 1212, 140 L.Ed.2d 341 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The debt at issue in the Gaddy case was an ordinary breach of contract judgment based on Gaddy's failure to fulfill his guarantor obligations. Id. Gaddy's fraudulent conduct – i.e., his transfer of assets to family members and entities he controlled – happened years after Gaddy incurred the guarantor debt. Id.; see also id. ("The money that the bank loaned is obviously not traceable to those later conveyances."). Thus, the debt at issue was not obtained by fraud.

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The Eleventh Circuit also rejected SEPH's argument fn17 that the Supreme Court's decision in Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 578 U.S. 355, 136 S.Ct. 1581, 194 L.Ed.2d 655 (2016) expanded section 523(a)(2)(A) to exempt from discharge claims premised on the debtor fraudulently transferring assets to hinder a creditor's collection efforts. Husky resolved a circuit split over whether "actual fraud" under section 523(a)(2)(A) requires a false representation or encompasses other traditional forms of fraud that can be accomplished without a false representation. Id. at 357, 136 S.Ct. 1581. The Supreme Court ruled that "actual fraud" can include "fraudulent conveyance schemes, even when those schemes do not involve a false representation." Id. at 366, 136 S.Ct. 1581. In responding to a point raised in the dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, stated the following:

It is of course true that the transferor does not "obtain" debts in a fraudulent conveyance. But the recipient of the transfer – who, with the requisite intent, also commits fraud – can "obtain" assets "by" his or her participation in the fraud.... If that recipient later files for bankruptcy, any debts "traceable to" the fraudulent conveyance ... will be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). Thus, at least sometimes a debt "obtained by" a fraudulent conveyance scheme could be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). Such circumstances may be rare because a person who receives fraudulently conveyed assets is not necessarily (or even likely to be) a debtor on the verge of bankruptcy, but they make clear that fraudulent conveyances are not wholly incompatible with the "obtained by" requirement.

Id. at 365, 136 S.Ct. 1581 (citations, alterations, and footnote omitted).

fn17.

Radiance Capital makes the same argument in its briefs here.

The Gaddy Court explained that Husky did not aid SEPH's argument for three reasons. First, Husky was factually distinguishable because the fraud debt owed by the bankruptcy debtor was different from the original debt, which was owed by a third party. Gaddy, 977 F.3d at 1057. In Husky, a corporation owed an ordinary debt to the creditor, and a corporate insider (i.e., the bankruptcy debtor) subsequently became potentially liable to the creditor under a veil-piercing statute when he drained corporate assets. Id. (citing Husky, 578 U.S. at 357-58, 136 S.Ct. 1581). Second, Husky did not eliminate the statutory requirement that the debt to be exempted must be "obtained by" fraud. Id.; see also id. ("Instead, [the Supreme Court in Husky and the Seventh Circuit in an analogous case] merely recognized the possibility that fraudulent schemes lacking a misrepresentation – including fraudulent transfers of assets to avoid creditors – can satisfy the 'obtained by' requirement in some circumstances."). Third, in Husky, the bankruptcy debtor's fraudulent acts (i.e., draining corporate assets) created the debts at issue, whereas, the debt at issue in Gaddy was "obtained by" Gaddy's failure to fulfill his guarantor obligation. Id. at 1057-58; see also id. at 1058 ("SEPH's assertions fail not because Gaddy did not engage in 'actual fraud' by conveying his assets but because the [real estate development] loans were not 'obtained by' fraud as required for exemption under § 523(a)(2)(A).").

Most pertinent to the instant matter, the Gaddy Court also rejected SEPH's alternative theory that Gaddy's transfers created a debt under Alabama fraudulent transfer law (separate from Gaddy's judgment debt), and such debt was nondischargeable. Id. at 1059. The Eleventh Circuit examined Alabama law and explained that the fraudulent transfer debt would impermissibly permit SEPH to recover twice for the same debt:

Generally, Alabama permits only one recovery for a given harm.... Yet SEPH seeks a new judgment for the same debt. It already has a judgment against Gaddy for the unpaid Water's Edge guaranties. It now seeks a second judgment entitling it to the same damages. SEPH asserted below no independent, freestanding harm from the fraudulent transfers themselves; it complained only that the transfers kept it from collecting the underlying debt.

PAGE_11

Id. at 1060 (citations omitted); see also id. ("Alabama law bars double recovery of compensatory damages for a fraud claim and a contract claim based on a single transaction.") (quoting Braswell v. ConAgra, Inc., 936 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1991)).

Here, Count I of Radiance Capital's Complaint is substantially similar to SEPH's alternative theory in Gaddy. For the reasons stated in Gaddy, Radiance Capital's potential fraudulent transfer claim against the Debtor is barred because it seeks a second recovery for the same harm, i.e., the Debtor's failure to pay Radiance Capital the amount owed under the Judgment. Radiance Capital has not alleged a separate fraud perpetrated by the Debtor and "complain[s] only that the transfers kept it from collecting the underlying debt." Id. at 1060. The underlying debt at issue – the Judgment – was not "obtained by" fraud; rather, the Judgment debt is based on the Debtor's failure to repay amounts owed under a loan.

Further, for the reasons stated in Gaddy, this Court rejects Radiance Capital's argument that Husky expanded the nondischargeability exemption in section 523(a)(2)(A) to include fraudulent transfer claims premised solely on a debtor's transfer of assets to hinder a creditor's collection efforts. The Supreme Court in Husky outlined a hypothetical in which a "recipient" of a transfer commits, or participates in, fraud with "requisite intent" and later files for bankruptcy. Husky, 578 U.S. at 365, 136 S.Ct. 1581. In such "rare" circumstance, debts "traceable to" the fraudulent transfer could be nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A). Id. (citation omitted). The facts here do not match Husky's hypothetical. As stated above, the underlying debt at issue is based on the Debtor's default of a business loan. The Debtor did not obtain the loan by committing fraud. Further, the money loaned to the Debtor by Vision Bank in 2007 "is obviously not traceable" to the transfers from the LLCs years later. Gaddy, 977 F.3d at 1056.

The facts here depart from Gaddy in one respect. Radiance Capital obtained entry of the Charging Orders in Alabama District Court granting it a lien on the Debtor's ownership interest in the LLCs and entitling Radiance Capital to distributions otherwise payable to the Debtor. However, a charging order under Alabama law does not provide the judgment creditor with the same rights generally enjoyed by a secured creditor. Although "[a] charging order constitutes a lien on the judgment debtor's transferable interest" fn18 (Ala. Code § 10A-5A-5.03(c); accord First Charging Order at 1 (granting a lien against the Debtor's "financial interests" in the LLCs)), the judgment creditor has "no right to foreclose ... upon the charging order, the charging order lien, or the judgment debtor's transferable interest." Ala. Code § 10A-5A-5.03(f). Nor can a judgment creditor "obtain possession of, or otherwise exercise legal or equitable remedies with respect to, the property" of the charged entity. Id. Rather, the judgment creditor "has only the right to receive any distribution or distributions to which the judgment debtor would otherwise be entitled in respect of the transferable interest." Ala. Code § 10A-5A-5.03(a); see also Ala. Code § 10A-5A-5.03(f) (stating that this section provides the "exclusive remedy" for the satisfaction of the judgment from the judgment debtor's transferable interest); accord Ala. Code § 10A-5A-5.03 editor's notes to subsection (d) ("This provision clarifies that a member or transferee whose transferable interest has been charged does not lose any of the member's or transferee's rights, other than the right to receive distributions from the limited liability company to the extent of the charging order.").

fn18.

A "transferable interest" was recently described by the Alabama Supreme Court as follows:

A "transferable interest" is "a member's right to receive distributions from a limited liability company or a series thereof." § 10A-5A-1.02(t), Ala. Code 1975. "Distribution" is defined as "a transfer of money or other property from a limited liability company, or series thereof, to another person on account of a transferable interest." § 10A-5A-1.02(h). A "distribution" does not include "amounts constituting reasonable compensation for present or past services or reasonable payments made in the ordinary course of the limited liability company's activities and affairs under a bona fide retirement plan or other benefits program." § 10A-5A-4.06(e), Ala. Code 1975.

SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Harrell (Ex Parte SE Prop. Holdings, LLC), 353 So.3d 533, 537-38 (Ala. 2021) ("Ex Parte SEPH").

In fact, in another case with facts similar to the current circumstances – SE Prop. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Green (In re Green), 968 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 2020) ("Green") – the Fifth Circuit dismissed a section 523(a)(2)(A) nondischargeability claim notwithstanding the fact that the judgment creditor in that case (again, SEPH) was the beneficiary of a charging order under Alabama law:

SEPH says Green hatched [a fraudulent transfer scheme] when he made disguised distributions to himself in violation of the charging order, which required certain of Green's companies to distribute to SEPH any amounts that become due or distributable to Green.

...

SEPH stumbles, however, on § 523(a)(2)(A)'s "obtained by" requirement. Even assuming that Green engaged in a fraudulent scheme, SEPH has not produced facts to suggest that Green obtained a debt from his alleged fraud; therefore, SEPH has not raised a genuine dispute of material fact.

Green, 968 F.3d at 521 (alteration and quotation marks from references to the record omitted). The existence of the Charging Orders here does not change the result on Radiance Capital's claim under section 523(a)(2)(A).

For the reasons stated, Count I must be dismissed.

D. Count II – "Willful and Malicious" Exception Under Section 523(a)(6)

Whereas the Debtor's violations of the Charging Orders do not play a meaningful role in Count I, they play a prominent role in the disposition of Count II. Section 523(a)(6) exempts from an individual debtor's bankruptcy discharge "any debt ... for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The "word 'willful' in (a)(6) modifies the word 'injury,' indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury." Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998) (emphases in original). Further, section 523(a)(6) encompasses "intentional torts" rather than "negligent or reckless torts," and intentional torts "generally require that the actor intend 'the consequences of an act,' not simply 'the act itself.' " Id. at 61-62, 118 S.Ct. 974 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, Comment a, p. 15 (1964)) (emphasis in original).

"The injury caused by the debtor must also be malicious, meaning 'wrongful and without just cause or excuse, even in the absence of personal hatred, spite, or ill-will.' " Ball v. A.O. Smith Corp., 451 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Navistar Fin. Corp. v. Stelluti (In re Stelluti), 94 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1996)). "Malice may be implied by the acts and conduct of the debtor in the context of the surrounding circumstances." Id. (citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted).

In Count II, Radiance Capital argues, among other things, that the Debtor "knowingly violated the [Charging Orders] in an effort to thwart [Radiance Capital's] security interest in the distributed funds." (Complaint ¶ 60.) "Failure to obey a court order constitutes willful and malicious conduct, and a judgment against a defiant debtor is excepted from discharge." Williams v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520 (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 512 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing PRP Wine Int'l, Inc. v. Allison (In re Allison), 176 B.R. 60, 64 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994)); see also O'Connor v. Trost (In re O'Connor), Adversary Nos. 07-21012, 08-2013, 2010 WL 3909726, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. La. Oct. 1, 2010) (quoting Williams and citing additional supporting authorities). Quoting a Western District of New York bankruptcy court decision, the Fifth Circuit in Williams explained that damages resulting from an intentional violation of a court order are ipso facto the result of "willful and malicious" injury:

PAGE_13

[W]hen a court of the United States ... issues an injunction or other protective order telling a specific individual what actions will cross the line into injury to others, then damages resulting from an intentional violation of that order as is proven either in the Bankruptcy Court or, so long as there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the questions of volition and violation, in the issuing court are ipso facto the result of a "willful and malicious injury."

This is because what is "just" or "unjust" conduct as between the parties has been defined by the court.... An intentional violation of the order is necessarily without "just cause or excuse" and cannot be viewed as not having the intention to cause the very harm to the protected persons that order was designed to prevent.

Williams, 337 F.3d at 512 (quoting Buffalo Gyn Womenservices, Inc. v. Behn (In re Behn), 242 B.R. 229, 238 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1999)). fn19

fn19.

The Fifth Circuit stated that this principle is not limited to violations of injunctions. Williams, 337 F.3d at 512 ("While the Behn opinion deals specifically with the violation of an injunction, the Agreed Judgment entered by the district court served a similar purpose of protecting the Union from further breaches of the CBA.").

It follows, therefore, that monetary sanctions levied against a party for intentionally violating a court order are per se nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6). As one court observed:

[W]here there is an order of a court finding a debtor in contempt for violating an earlier court order, for purposes of establishing a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6), it is conclusively presumed or established by that contempt order that (1) the debtor's conduct caused an injury to the other party, and (2) that the sanctions awarded are a "debt ... for [that] injury ...." In other words, a debt arising as a result of a violation of a court order does not require proof of an injury beyond showing that the court order was knowingly violated, and neither the existence of an injury nor the amount (or reasonableness) of damages from an injury need be established beyond showing that the court imposed sanctions on the debtor for the violation.

Boehm v. Papst (In re Papst), Adversary No. 06-3026, 2007 WL 274969, at *7 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2007).

A party who violates a charging order under Alabama law may be held in contempt. See Ala. Code § 10A-5A-5.03 editor's notes to subsection (f) ("This provision attempts to eliminate the problems encountered by overly broad court orders. The provision was not intended, nor should it be interpreted, to prevent a court from enforcing its charging order against the person who violates the charging order.") (emphasis added); cf. Ex Parte SEPH, 353 So.3d at 539 (reversing denial of request to hold a party in contempt for violating an Alabama charging order where the trial court denied such request without holding a contempt hearing); see also id. ("In the present case, the evidence in the record demonstrates that Harrell [violated the charging order]. Thus, the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying SEPH's petition based on the materials in the record.") (citation omitted).

The record here establishes that the Debtor knowingly violated the Charging Orders. The Charging Orders required the LLCs to make distributions to Radiance Capital that are otherwise payable to the Debtor "by reason of any interest he owns in the [LLCs]" until the Judgment was fully satisfied. (First Charging Order at 1; Second Charging Order at 1.) The Charging Orders also required the LLCs to notify Radiance Capital each time a distribution subject to the order was made. (First Charging Order at 2; Second Charging Order at 2.) In contravention of the orders, the Debtor caused Whigham Place to make dozens of transfers directly to the Debtor throughout the decade following the entry of the Charging Orders. Whigham Place is a single-asset real estate company that collects rent proceeds from its ownership of commercial real estate in Alabama, and the Debtor provided no business justification for Whigham Place's transfers of funds to the Debtor. These transfers must therefore be viewed as transfers on account of the Debtor's ownership and control of Whigham Place in violation of the Charging Orders.

PAGE_14

The remainder of the transfers were technically made to third parties but were for the benefit of the Debtor. Transfers from Whigham Place to WB Property were used to fund the Debtor's living expenses as he used WB Property's bank account "as a personal checking account." (Debtor Deposition at 23:9-10; see also id. at 26:16-21, 27:9-21, 28:20-29:19.)

Transfers from Whigham Place to Clairise Court and Able Builders represented funds that were purportedly payable to the Debtor but were instead deposited into the accounts of the latter two entities. (Id. at 15:3-20; 32:8-16.) The Debtor characterized these as "salary" payments to himself (id.), but that assertion lacks merit. Although the Debtor owns Whigham Place, he is not an employee of, or otherwise entitled to salary from, Whigham Place. fn20

fn20.

The Debtor stated in his 2019 and 2020 tax returns that he was an employee of Clairise Court in those years (Radiance Fact Statement, Ex. 22), and stated in his bankruptcy schedule that he is employed by Able Builders. (Income Schedule, Parts 1 and 2.) Since Whigham Place was the transferor of these transfers, it cannot be said that the transfers represented payment of salary by Clairise Court or Able Builders to the Debtor. Further, (i) the transfers from Whigham Place to Clairise Court ($57,390.00) far exceeded the Debtor's reported income from Clairise Court ($4,000.00) for those years, and (ii) the sole transfer from Whigham Place to Able Builders occurred in November 2022, and Able Builders' license to perform contractor work lapsed a "couple of years" prior to the Debtor's February 2024 deposition. (Debtor Deposition at 31:16-32:7.) Thus, any assertion that these transfers were used to pay the Debtor's Clairise Court or Able Builders salary would be questionable at best.

The transfer from Antilles GP to Marina similarly represented funds that were purportedly payable to the Debtor but were instead transferred to Marina. The Debtor admitted that he caused Antilles GP to return a prior capital contribution to him and transferred those funds to Marina. (Debtor Opposition ¶ 16.) The return of a prior capital contribution can be seen as nothing other than a distribution on account of the Debtor's equity interest in Antilles GP.

Last, the transfers from Whigham Place to JP Morgan paid sizeable balances for three JP Morgan credit card accounts held in the name of "John F. Campbell Clairise Court LLC." As set forth above, the Debtor routinely used the credit cards to cover his personal expenses including attorney's fees to his divorce attorney.

The Debtor does not dispute that he was aware of the Charging Orders when he made the transfers from Whigham Place and Antilles GP. Instead, the Debtor relies on two arguments. First, the Debtor points out that the IRS has a lien over all of the Debtor's assets that is senior to Radiance Capital's liens created by the Charging Orders. The IRS lien, the Debtor argues, nullifies the effect of the Charging Orders. (See Debtor Brief ¶ 3 ("[The Charging Orders have] at all times been subordinate to the IRS Lien, and [Radiance Capital] has not been entitled to any payments from the charged entities.").)

This argument lacks merit. As the Supreme Court explained, absent a stay pending appeal, a party subject to an order must comply with the order "promptly" and may not make "private determinations" about the legal effect of that order:

PAGE_15

We begin with the basic proposition that all orders and judgments of courts must be complied with promptly. If a person to whom a court directs an order believes that order is incorrect the remedy is to appeal, but, absent a stay, he must comply promptly with the order pending appeal. Persons who make private determinations of the law and refuse to obey an order generally risk criminal contempt even if the order is ultimately ruled incorrect.

Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458, 95 S.Ct. 584, 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975). Here, the Debtor did not appeal, or even object to the entry of, either Charging Order. He has never argued to the Alabama District Court that the IRS lien negates the effect of the Charging Orders. His conclusion about the effect of the IRS lien is a "private determination of the law," which does not excuse his refusal to comply with the Charging Orders. Id. fn21

fn21.

The Court's ruling should not be interpreted to mean that the IRS is foreclosed from subsequently appearing in the Alabama District Court or elsewhere to assert its rights against the Debtor's assets. That matter is simply not before this Court. Accord Renteria v. Canepa, No. 3:11-cv-00534-RCJ-CWH, 2013 WL 3155348, at *2 (D. Nev. June 19, 2013) ("The Court also agrees that no controversy between Plaintiffs and the IRS is before the Court. It is only for this Court to determine whether the charging order requested is available under state law, which it is[.] ... If the IRS or the entities to be charged wish to challenge Plaintiff's subsequent attempts to enforce the charging order under federal priority statutes, that is a separate matter.").

Moreover, the Debtor's argument makes little sense as a matter of practicality. The Debtor is not paying the tax debt he owes to the IRS, and the IRS has apparently not foreclosed on the Debtor's assets even though its lien "was perfected on September 1, 2010." (Debtor Brief ¶ 2.) In the meantime, the Debtor may not use the prospect of a future tax foreclosure as a talisman to deny the rights of his other creditors.

Second, the Debtor asserts that Radiance Capital and its counsel knew, or should have known, of transfers from the LLCs in 2014 but "did not complain" to the Debtor. (Debtor Brief ¶ 21 ("[S]ince SEPH, [Radiance Capital and its attorney] knew, or should have known, of the transfers since January 2014 because of the numerous subpoenas they had served to acquire financial records, and did not complain to [the Debtor] or take any action, [the Debtor] had no reason to believe that [Radiance Capital] considered the transfers against its interest.") (emphasis omitted).) Radiance Capital disputes the Debtor's assertion and responds that it did not learn of the transfers until much later. (See generally Fontenot Affidavit.)

This argument too lacks merit irrespective of when Radiance Capital learned of the transfers. The onus is on the party to whom a court directs an action to promptly comply with that directive. Maness, 419 U.S. at 458, 95 S.Ct. 584. The party who benefits from a court order does not have a duty to follow up with the losing party to ensure compliance with the order. In fact, the Charging Orders placed an affirmative duty on the Debtor to report to Radiance Capital transfers subject to the orders – a duty that the Debtor has completely ignored. Thus, the Debtor's argument – that SEPH and Radiance Capital waived their rights under the Charging Orders because they knew (or should have known) that the Debtor had been in continuous violation of those orders from their very entry – is utterly meritless.

PAGE_16

Based on the legal precedent cited above, the Debtor's knowing violations of the Charging Orders constitute "willful and malicious" conduct and the monetary sanctions stemming from such violations are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Radiance Capital sought monetary sanctions against the Debtor by filing the Sanctions Motion in June 2023, but the Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition before the Alabama District Court could adjudicate the Sanctions Motion. Although this Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a claim is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (see supra statement of jurisdiction), it must abstain from determining what the amount and scope of a sanction should be. That is because "the power to sanction contempt is jurisdictional." Alderwoods Grp., Inc. v. Garcia, 682 F.3d 958, 970 (11th Cir. 2012). Specifically:

The power of a court to make an order carries with it the equal power to punish for a disobedience of that order, and the inquiry as to the question of disobedience has been, from time immemorial, the special function of the ordering court. To submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency. The sole adjudication of contempts, and the punishments thereof belong exclusively to each respective court.

Id. (quoting In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594-95, 15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895)) (alterations omitted).

Therefore, while it is appropriate for this Court to determine whether the Debtor engaged in "willful and malicious" conduct within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the Alabama District Court must be the court that issues the contempt order for the Debtor's violations of the Charging Orders. To facilitate the Alabama District Court's determination of appropriate sanctions, this Court will modify the automatic stay sua sponte to permit Radiance Capital to continue prosecution of the Sanctions Motion or otherwise seek sanctions for the Debtor's violations of the Charging Orders in the Alabama Action. In re Laventhol & Horwath, 139 B.R. 109, 116 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (bankruptcy court may sua sponte modify the automatic stay to allow litigation to proceed in another forum); Putnam Cty. Sav. Bank v. Bagen (In re Bagen), 185 B.R. 691, 701 n.15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same).

E. Count III – Declaratory Judgment

Bankruptcy courts may issue a declaratory judgment pursuant to Rule 7001(i) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, fn22 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 ("Act"), governs the availability of declaratory relief in federal courts. Golden v. Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Tr. 2006-4 (NCT 2006) (In re Golden), 671 B.R. 544, 585 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2025) (citation omitted). The Act provides that in "a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States ... may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The Act "has a broad remedial purpose and, therefore, should be construed liberally." Katz v. Wagner (In re Metiom, Inc.), No. 01-12840 (RLB), 2002 WL 433588, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2002) (quotation omitted). Bankruptcy courts have the "power to issue declaratory judgments when the matter in controversy regards the administration of a pending bankruptcy estate." Golden, 671 B.R. at 586 (quoting Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. O'Brien, 178 F.3d 962, 964 (8th Cir. 1999)).

fn22.

Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7001(i) provides that a party may commence an adversary proceeding "to obtain a declaratory judgment related to any proceeding described in" Rule 7001(a) – (h).

In Count III, Radiance Capital seeks a declaratory judgment that the liens created by the Charging Orders survive the Debtor's bankruptcy discharge. "[L]iens pass through bankruptcy unaffected" unless they are avoided fn23 or otherwise addressed. City of Concord v. N. New England Tel. Operations LLC (In re N. New England Tel. Operations LLC), 795 F.3d 343, 346 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992)); see also In re Gierlinger, 580 B.R. 314, 317 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2017). The same is true for liens created by charging orders. See Binder v. Binder PC v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 128, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that a charging lien securing payment of attorney's fees would survive a bankruptcy discharge); see also Santangelo v. Clarvit (In re Santangelo), 643 B.R. 481, 488 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2022) (bankruptcy discharge did not enjoin attorney who represented debtor in a defamation action from enforcing pre-petition charging lien).

fn23.

The Debtor previously moved to avoid the Charging Orders under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), but the Court denied the Debtor's motion. (See Order Denying Motion to Avoid Judicial Liens, dated October 31, 2024 (ECF Main Case Doc. # 55).)

Here, the liens created by the Charging Orders are valid and have not been avoided or otherwise addressed in this bankruptcy case. Therefore, such liens survive the Debtor's bankruptcy discharge.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER fn24

fn24.

Arguments made by the parties but not specifically addressed herein have been considered by the Court and rejected or rendered moot by the Court's ruling.

For the reasons stated, it is Ordered that:

• as to Count I, the Debtor Motion is GRANTED, and Count I is DISMISSED;

• as to Count II, the Radiance Capital Motion is GRANTED to the extent of concluding that any sanction issued by the Alabama District Court based on the Debtor's violations of the Charging Orders is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6);

o the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is modified sua sponte to permit Radiance Capital to continue prosecution of the Sanctions Motion or otherwise seek sanctions for the Debtor's violations of the Charging Orders in the Alabama Action;

o counsel to Radiance Capital shall send a copy of this Memorandum Decision and Order to the Judge presiding over the Alabama Action;

• as to Count III, the Radiance Capital Motion is GRANTED to the extent of concluding that the liens created by the Charging Orders survive the Debtor's bankruptcy discharge;

• the Motions are otherwise DENIED; and

• the parties shall appear for a status conference on January 29, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. to discuss any remaining matters in this adversary proceeding.

Campbell v. Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve LLC (In re Campbell), 2026 WL 1146587 (S.D.N.Y., April 28, 2026).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

In re: JOHN F. CAMPBELL, Debtor.

JOHN F. CAMPBELL, Appellant,

RADIANCE CAPITAL RECEIVABLES TWELVE LLC, Appellee.

26-CV-02134 (PMH)

Filed 04/28/2026

Attorneys and Law Firms

John F. Campbell, Livingston Manor, NY, Pro Se.

Gilbert Larose Fontenot, Maples & Fontenot, LLP, Mobile, AL, for Appellee.

OPINION & ORDER

PHILIP M. HALPERN United States District Judge

PAGE__1

Before the Court is Appellant's "Motion for Determination That the Notice of Appeal is Timely" (Doc. 5, "Appellant's Motion"), and Appellee's motion to dismiss this appeal as untimely. (Doc. 22, "Appellee's Motion"). fn1

fn1. The Court construes Appellee's pre-motion letter (Doc. 22) as its motion to dismiss and Appellant's response letter (Doc. 24) as his opposition. See In re Best Payphones, Inc., 450 F. App'x 8, 15 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding the Court did not abuse its discretion in construing the parties' letter-motions as the motions themselves, and ruling on them); see also Brown v. New York, No. 21-1408-CV, 2022 WL 221343, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 2022) (same). The Court's Individual Practices Rule 2(C) provides that the Court reserves the discretion to construe pre-motion letters as the motion itself, thereby putting the parties on notice of this possibility.

For the reasons stated below, Appellant's Motion is granted, and Appellee's Motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Appellee commenced the adversary proceeding underlying this appeal on March 5, 2024, seeking "damages and a declaration ... that certain obligations owed to [Appellee] are not dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6)." (Br. Doc. 1). fn2 On July 29, 2025, Appellant and Appellee both moved for summary judgment. (Br. Docs. 82, 85). The bankruptcy court, on January 12, 2026, issued a "Memorandum Decision and Order (I) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, (II) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and (III) Modifying the Automatic Stay to Allow Prosecution of the Sanctions Motion." (Br. Doc. 111, "Memorandum Decision and Order"). The bankruptcy court held that Appellant's debts to Appellee stemming from violations of charging orders issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama fn3 are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), but not 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2(A), and issued a declaratory judgment that Appellee's liens against Appellant's interests in various LLCs survive Appellant's bankruptcy discharge. (Id. at 24, 31-32, 34). The bankruptcy court, accordingly, modified the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) to allow Appellee to seek sanctions against Appellant in the Southern District of Alabama. (Id. at 34).

fn2. Citations to "Br. Doc." refer to docket entries in the underlying adversary proceeding whereas citations to "Doc." refer to docket entries in this matter. Citations to specific pages of filings on the docket correspond to the pagination generated by ECF.

fn3. See SE Property Holdings, LLC, et al. v. John F. Campbell, et al., 13-CV-00238 (S.D. Ala.).

Appellant, on January 28, 2026, filed a motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in the bankruptcy court. (Br. Doc. 113). The bankruptcy court held a hearing on January 29, 2026, and stated that the Memorandum Decision and Order was the final order for purposes of appeal and that it would enter judgment as a formality. (See Doc. 5-2 at 16). The bankruptcy court entered judgment on February 4, 2026. (Br. Doc. 116). On February 12, 2026, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. (Br. Doc. 117). On March 13, 2026, the bankruptcy court issued a memorandum decision and order denying Appellant's motion for an extension of time to appeal and concluding that Appellant's February 12, 2026 notice of appeal was untimely, but that it lacked jurisdiction to strike the notice of appeal. (Br. Doc. 132 at 6-7, 9-14). The bankruptcy court requested that this Court "process the Notice of Appeal in the ordinary course." (Id. at 14).

PAGE__2

The notice of appeal was filed and the record on appeal transmitted on March 16, 2026. (Docs. 1-3). On March 17, 2026, Appellant's Motion was filed. Respondent filed opposition on March 31, 2026. (Docs. 12-13, "Appellee Opp."). Appellant filed reply on April 19, 2026. (Doc. 25). fn4 On April 14, 2026, Appellee's Motion was filed, seeking dismissal of this appeal on the grounds that it is untimely and, thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it. Appellant filed a response to Appellee's Motion on April 15, 2026. (Doc. 24, "Appellant Opp.").

fn4. Appellant's reply was untimely under Local Civil Rule 6.1(b) and the Court therefore does not consider it in deciding Appellant's Motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002(a) provides that "a notice of appeal must be filed with the bankruptcy clerk within 14 days after entry of the judgment, order, or decree being appealed." "This time limit is jurisdictional and 'in the absence of a timely notice of appeal in the district court, the district court is wholly without jurisdiction to consider the appeal, regardless of whether the appellant can demonstrate 'excusable neglect.' " In re Abraham, No. 21-CV-01628, 2021 WL 5597939, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2021) (quoting In re Siemon, 421 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2005)). "Pro se status does not excuse a party from this jurisdictional requirement." Id.

ANALYSIS

I. Timeliness of Appeal

Appellant contends that his notice of appeal is timely under Rule 8002(a) because it was filed within fourteen days of the February 4, 2026 judgment entered by the bankruptcy court. (See Appellant's Motion at 5; Appellant's Opp. at 3). Appellee argues that the notice of appeal was untimely because the fourteen-day clock began to run when the bankruptcy court issued the January 12, 2026 Memorandum Decision and Order and Appellant's February 12, 2026 notice of appeal was therefore filed after the closing of the fourteen-day window. (Appellee's Opp. at 1; Appellee's Motion at 1). Appellant's principal argument is that the bankruptcy court's Memorandum Decision and Order "does not meet the separate document requirement of FRCP 58(a)" and, thus, "did not start the 14-day clock for purposes of filing a notice of appeal." (Appellant's Motion at 5). The Court agrees.

28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) gives district courts "jurisdiction to hear appeals (1) from final judgments, orders, and decrees." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a), made applicable to adversary proceedings by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7058, provides that "[e]very judgment and amended judgment must be set out in a separate document" and includes an enumerated list of exceptions not applicable here. "Rule 58 directs the clerk of the court to enter judgment in favor of a prevailing party on a separate document following a decision by the court, and it serves to inform the parties that the court has reached a final decision." Porges v. Gruntal & Co. (In re Porges), 44 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Ellender v. Schweiker, 781 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir. 1986)). The Supreme Court has unanimously held that Rule 58 "must be mechanically applied in order to avoid new uncertainties as to the date on which a judgment is entered." United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 222 (1973) (per curiam). While "[i]t may be possible to appeal in advance of the Rule 58 judgment ... it is never necessary to do so." In re Kilgus, 811 F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

Orders granting summary judgment are typically subject to the separate document requirement of Rule 58(a). See Perry v. Sheet Metal Workers' Local No. 73 Pension Fund, 585 F.3d 358, 361 (7th Cir. 2009) ("The grant of a motion for summary judgment is not one of the exceptions to the separate document requirement listed in Rule 58(a), so a separate document was required in this case to have a proper Rule 58 judgment."); Howard v. Onion, No. 24-3273, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 12372, at *2 (6th Cir. May 20, 2024) ("For an appeal from an order granting summary judgment," the time to appeal "begins to run from the date a separate judgment is entered on the docket."). Indeed, while "[a] one-sentence order denying a motion satisfies the requirement" of Rule 58(a), "an order that is part of an opinion or memorandum does not." Redhead v. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 360 F. App'x 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (citing RR Vill. Ass'n Inc. v. Denver Sewer Corp., 826 F.2d 1197, 1201 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Creaghe v. Albemarle Corp., 98 F. App'x 972, 973 (5th Cir. 2004) ("To be 'separate,' a judgment must be apart from any document detailing either the court's factual findings or the legal basis of the court's ruling; it may not be part of a memorandum or opinion.").

PAGE__3

If "a separate document is required pursuant to Rule 58(a), then judgment is entered when said judgment is docketed pursuant to Rule 79(a) and 'the earlier of these events occurs: (A) it is set out in a separate document; or (B) 150 days have run from the entry in the civil docket.' " Redhead, 360 F. App'x at 234 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)). The Second Circuit interprets "Rule 58's requirements to prevent the loss of an appeal whenever reasonable ...." Cole-Hoover v. Richmond, 804 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Creaghe, 98 F. App'x at 973); see also Bogaerts v. Shapiro (In re Litas Int'l, Inc.), 316 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The rule should be interpreted to prevent loss of the right to appeal, not to facilitate loss." (citation modified)).

Here, the bankruptcy court's Memorandum Decision and Order was a fourteen-page decision, laying out the court's legal reasoning. (See Memorandum Decision and Order). The Memorandum Decision and Order does not satisfy Rule 58(a)'s separate document requirement. See Redhead, 360 F. App'x at 233; Creaghe, 98 F. App'x at 973; see also United States ex rel. Rudd v. Schimmels (In re Schimmels), 85 F.3d 416, 422 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment met separate document requirement where "[t]he order granting summary judgment [was] a brief order that g[ave] no detailed explanations and d[id] not contain an opinion or a memorandum."); Clough v. Rush, 959 F.2d 182, 185 (10th Cir. 1992) ("The order which the district court entered disposing of the motion for summary judgment does not meet Rule 58 requirements. In addition to being fifteen pages long, it contained detailed legal analysis and reasoning. Thus, it could not, standing alone, trigger the appeal process."). Instead, the February 4, 2026 judgment was the separate document required by Rule 58 which started the time to appeal. Appellant's February 12, 2026 notice of appeal was, thus, timely under Rule 8002(a).

Appellee cites Bucurescu v. 190a Realty Corp. (In re Bucurescu), 282 B.R. 124, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) for the proposition that "[a]n appellant whose appeal to [the] district court was ruled untimely by the bankruptcy court cannot move the district court to accept the appeal as timely because the district court lacks jurisdiction to excuse an untimely filing." (Appellee Opp. at 2-3). Bucurescu does not stand for that proposition. Instead, it simply states that a district court "has no authority to excuse untimely filing of a notice of appeal." Bucurescu, 282 B.R. at 131. Here, Appellant's notice of appeal was timely. That Appellant at one point thought his notice of appeal was untimely, does not change that it was timely under a mechanical application of Rule 58. Furthermore, contrary to Appellee's assertion, the bankruptcy court did not rule that the notice of appeal is untimely, but instead explicitly stated that it "lack[ed] jurisdiction to strike the Notice of Appeal" and "[t]he issue of timeliness may be addressed by the District Court on appeal." (Br. Doc. 132 at 14).

Accordingly, under Rule 8002(a), Appellant's notice of appeal was timely.

II. Service of Motion

Appellee contends, in its opposition to Appellant's Motion, that Appellant's failure to serve his motion on Appellee is an additional basis to deny Appellant's Motion. Appellee cites no case law in support of this proposition.

"Any motion made in writing, other than ex parte motions, must be served on the other party and 'filed' with the court." Phoenix Global Ventures, LLC v. Phoenix Hotel Assocs., Ltd., 422 F.3d 72, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a), (d)). While Appellant's Motion may have been in an "inchoate state" until it was served, see International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 669 (2d Cir. 1977), Appellant did serve his motion on Appellee (see Doc. 15), albeit untimely, and Appellee responded to Appellant's Motion (see Appellee Opp.). Appellee could have requested an extension of time to respond to Appellant's Motion, but Appellant's failure to timely serve does not warrant denial of Appellant's Motion. See Yaohua Deng v. Compass Group USA Inc., 481 F. App'x 28, 29 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) ("[Plaintiff] had actual knowledge of the defendants' summary judgment motion, and yet he made no effort ... [to] request an extension of time from the district court to file his opposition to the motion."); McKinnie v. Roadway Express, Inc., 341 F.3d 554, 555 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The violation of Rule 5(b), however, does not provide a sufficient basis to reverse the district court's summary judgment because Plaintiffs had actual notice that the summary judgment motion had been filed."). fn5

fn5. Even if the Court were to deny Appellant's Motion for untimely service on Appellee, it would not alter the result here. Appellant's Motion and Appellee's Motion ask the Court to decide the same issue—whether the notice of appeal was timely filed.

CONCLUSION

PAGE__4

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's Motion is GRANTED and Appellee's Motion is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions pending at Doc. 5 and Doc. 22.

SO ORDERED:

Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve LLC v. Campbell, 2026 WL 1147610 (S.D.Ala., April 28, 2026).

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

RADIANCE CAPITAL RECEIVABLES TWELVE, LLC, Plaintiff,

JOHN F. CAMPBELL, Defendant.

CIV. ACT. NO. 1:13-cv-238-TFM-C

Filed 04/28/2026

Attorneys and Law Firms

Gilbert L. Fontenot, Maples & Fontenot, LLP, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff.

John F. Campbell, Pro Se, Livingston Manor, NY, David Finkler, Glen Rock, NJ, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TERRY F. MOORER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

PAGE__1

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 65, filed 6/29/23) which was stayed until the bankruptcy court lifted the stay. Plaintiff Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve, LLC's ("Plaintiff" or "Radiance") seeks a finding of contempt and sanctions for a violation of the charging order. After the stay was lifted, Defendant John F. Campbell ("Defendant" or "Campbell") filed his response and Plaintiff filed its reply. Docs. 102, 104. The Court held a show cause hearing on March 25, 2026. The Court orally granted the motion at the hearing and indicated a written opinion would follow. This is that opinion.

The motion for sanctions (Doc. 65) is GRANTED and sanctions are imposed herein. The Court also DENIES as moot the motion to strike (Doc. 109) and the motion for leave to file an objection to the proposed order (Docs. 115, 116) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 23, 2013, SE Property Holdings, LLC ("SEPH"), successor by merger with Vision Bank, filed a complaint seeking repayment of a $305,000.00 loan to Campbell which was in default for non-payment. See Doc. 1. On September 9, 2013, this Court entered summary judgment in favor of SEPH and against Campbell in the total amount of $317,135.00. Doc. 19. Campbell did not satisfy the judgment and SEPH requested Charging Orders against numerous companies in which Campbell had an interest. Docs. 22, 37. On October 21, 2013, and again on January 21, 2014, this Court entered charging orders (the "Charging Orders"), granting SEPH liens on Campbell's interest in numerous limited liability companies (collectively, the "charged entities"). Docs. 23, 40.

The Charging Orders contained identical language that required of Campbell as follows:

ORDERED that a lien is charged against the financial interests of John F. Campbell in the Companies in the amount of $317,135.00, being the final judgment of September 9, 2013, rendered in favor of Plaintiff and against John F. Campbell, plus accrued interest and costs, and that said Companies are Ordered to distribute to the Plaintiff any income, officer's fees, bonuses, distributions, salaries or dividends paid or otherwise conveyed to John F. Campbell by reason of any interest he owns in the Companies until Plaintiff's judgment is satisfied in full.

Id. On December 20, 2018, SEPH assigned the judgment to Radiance, and on November 20, 2020, Radiance replaced SEPH as plaintiff in this matter as the successor in interest. Doc. 47. Other than the substitution of parties in November of 2020, the docket reflects no collection activity undertaken by Radiance until early December of 2022 when it commenced issuing garnishments on Campbell and subpoenas to various financial institutions. On June 26, 2023, Radiance filed the instant motion for sanctions against Campbell for violating the Charging Orders, alleging Campbell made distributions from charged entities to himself and third parties in contravention of the Charging Orders. Doc. 65. This Court set an initial hearing date of July 31, 2023, which the Court continued at the request of Campell to retain counsel. Doc. 76. On August 11, 2023, Campbell filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, case number 23-35668. Doc. 82. Pursuant to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), this Court necessarily stayed all further proceedings, including Radiance's motion for sanctions. Doc. 91.

PAGE__2

On March 5, 2024, Radiance filed an adversary proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York styled Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve LLC v. John F. Campbell, Adversary Proceeding No. 24-09009 (the "Adversary Proceeding"), objecting to discharge of Campbell's liability related to the distributions from the charged entities. Doc.112-2. In the Adversary Proceeding, the parties filed competing summary judgments, supported by affidavits, deposition testimony and financial documents, and responses and replies to the dueling motions, all of which have been filed of record with this Court. On January 12, 2026, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order denying Radiance's summary judgment request for non-discharge of its debt based upon fraudulent conveyances pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), but finding that Campbell "knowingly violated the Charging Orders" resulting in a "willful and malicious injury" to Radiance within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Doc. 100-1. As part of the briefing on the motions, Campbell raised arguments in support of his summary judgment motion and defenses in response to Radiance's summary judgment motion, summarized generally as 1) a prior IRS lien prevented his compliance with the Charging Orders, 2) that Radiance waived enforcement of the Charging Order violations, 3) that the Charging Orders could not apply to certain charged entities and 4) a claim that some distributions received by Campbell were actually compensation paid to him by the charged entities. Each of these issues was thoroughly briefed and litigated by the parties and in its ruling the Bankruptcy Court held each defense to be either irrelevant or "utterly meritless" in reaching its decision that Campbell violated the Charging Orders. In its decision, the Bankruptcy Court abstained from determining what the amount and scope of a sanction should be against Campbell for his willful violation of the Charging Orders and sue sponta modified the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) to permit Radiance to continue to prosecute before this Court its motion for sanctions filed in June of 2023 for a determination as to the appropriate sanction.

On January 12, 2026, Radiance notified the Court that the stay had been lifted to proceed with the contempt motion. Doc. 100. This Court set response and reply deadlines for the parties, and on March 9, 2026, Campbell filed his response with extensive documentation in support, later filing additional documents in support of his positions. Docs. 102, 111, 112. Radiance filed its reply on March 16, 2026. Doc.104. On March 25, 2026, this Court held its show cause hearing. The corporate representative of Radiance attended virtually while everyone else attended in person. Campbell proceeded pro se in this proceeding though he did have counsel in the bankruptcy proceeding in the Southern District of New York.

II. LAW GENERALLY

"[C]ivil contempt proceeding[s are] brought to enforce a court order that requires [a party] to act in some defined manner." Chairs v. Burgess, 143 F.3d 1432, 1436 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Mercer v. Mitchell, 908 F.2d 763, 768 (11th Cir. 1990)). "A finding of civil contempt — willful disregard of the authority of the court — must be supported by clear and convincing evidence." Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 2000)). "The clear and convincing evidence must establish that: (1) the allegedly violated order was valid and lawful; (2) the order was clear and unambiguous; and (3) the alleged violator had the ability to comply with the order." Id. (citations omitted). In Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011), the Court recognized that civil contempt differs from criminal contempt "in that it seeks only to coerce the defendant to do what the court has previously ordered him to do." Id. at 441 (citation omitted). In other words, a civil contempt defendant "carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket," because he is purged of contempt once he complies with the underlying order. Id.

If a party is found to be in civil contempt of court, the Court has the power to impose coercive and compensatory sanctions. See Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1301 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). "The measure of the court's power in civil contempt proceedings is determined by the requirements of full remedial relief. This may entail the doing of a variety of acts...." EEOC v. Guardian Pools, Inc., 828 F.2d 1507, 1515 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947)). "When fashioning a sanction to secure compliance, a district court should consider 'the character and magnitude of the harm threatened by continued contumacy and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired.' " Citronelle-Mobile, 943 F.2d at 1304 (quoting EEOC, 828 F.2d at 1515). Sanctions may be imposed to coerce the contemnor to comply with the court's order but may not be so excessive as to be punitive in nature. Matter of Trinity Industries, Inc., 876 F.2d 1485, 1493 (11th Cir. 1989).

III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PAGE__3

The Court finds the following by clear and convincing evidence.

1. Charging Orders were properly entered against Campbell by this Court on October 21, 2013, and renewed on January 21, 2014. Campbell did not object after the motions requesting the Charging Orders were filed or after entry of the Charging Orders, whether by counsel or otherwise.

2. Campbell and the charged entities received notice of the Charging Orders and Campbell has not asserted that notice was lacking or in any way deficient.

3. From the date of entry of the Charging Orders up to December of 2022, Campbell violated the Charging Orders by taking distributions from the charged entities directly for his benefit or by paying such to third parties without any business justification for the transfers. These transfers greatly exceeded the amount of Radiance's judgment.

4. In the Adversary Proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court clearly held that Campbell violated the Charging Orders, deferring only an adjudication as to the amount or type of sanction for this Court to determine. This Court take judicial notice of the bankruptcy court's findings and agrees that Campbell willfully violated the Charging Orders when he took distributions from the charged entities for his direct or indirect benefit and failed to pay such to Radiance as so ordered.

5. Campbell admitted to violating the Charging Orders in his Response to this Court and in open court at his contempt hearing. See Doc. 104.

6. Based on the testimony at the hearing, argument by the parties, the pleadings, documents, and other evidence submitted with the pleadings that the parties have filed, the Court finds that Campbell is in contempt of this Court's orders of October 21, 2013, and January 21, 2014. fn1

fn1. Plaintiff timely filed a motion to revive judgment, which the Court granted. See Docs. 63, 99. Thus, the Court's orders are still in effect despite the passing of ten years.

7. This Court further finds that the defenses Campbell asserts again in this proceeding were previously presented and argued to the Bankruptcy Court by Campbell and the Bankruptcy Court made adverse findings on each issue. In the Eleventh Circuit, a bankruptcy court ruling can have res judicata effect in a subsequent district court proceeding when four elements are satisfied: (1) the prior judgment was made by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) the judgment was final and on the merits, (3) both cases involve the same parties or their privies, and (4) both cases involve the same causes of action. Hart v. Yamaha-Parts Distributors, Inc., 787 F.2d 1468, 1470 (11th Cir. 1986). Res judicata "extends not only to the precise legal theory presented in the previous litigation, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the same 'operative nucleus of fact.' " Id. at 1470-71 (citing Olmstead v. Amoco Oil Co., 725 F.2d 627, 632 (11th Cir.1984)).

Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, requires four elements to be satisfied before a party can be precluded from relitigating an issue that was previously decided: (1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one involved in the prior proceeding, (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding, (3) the prior determination of the issue must have been a critical and necessary part of the earlier decision, and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 148 (2015). "The determination of a question directly involved in one action is conclusive as to that question in a second suit." Id. at 147.

PAGE__4

The Bankruptcy Court was a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties in the Adversary Proceeding are identical to the parties now before this Court, the causes of action are inherently the same, the ruling was a final judgment on the merits, and no matters remain for decision before the Bankruptcy Court as it relates to this particular issue. Each issue that Campbell now raises in his defense were raised by him in the Adversary Proceeding, Campbell's defenses raised there, and now here, are identical, and the Adversary Proceedings pleadings provided by the parties in support or against this instant motion reflect that Campbell was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior proceeding. Accordingly, Campbell's prior defenses, now raised once again before this Court, are barred by the various preclusion doctrines and not subject to re-litigation in this proceeding. However, even if they were not, for the same reasons identified by the Bankruptcy Court, this Court would reject those defenses.

8. The information in Defendant's financial affidavit is largely irrelevant, as the bankruptcy court already thoroughly reviewed Defendant's finances and the Court takes judicial notice of the bankruptcy court's findings regarding Defendant's financial status. However, even considering the financial affidavit, the outcome is the same. Plaintiff's motion to strike the unsworn financial affidavit (Doc. 109) is due to be denied as moot because Defendant filed a new financial affidavit in response (Doc. 111), which was properly sworn.

9. Defendant had ample opportunity to be heard and present evidence during the hearing on March 26, 2026. Accordingly, the motion for leave to file objection and supplement (Docs. 115, 116) are due to be denied. Campbell could have presented these matters at the hearing but did not for whatever reason. The hearing is not ongoing and the evidence at this point is closed.

10. The clear and convincing evidence establish that: (1) the Charging Orders violated were valid and lawful; (2) the orders were clear and unambiguous; and (3) Campbell had the ability to comply with the orders.

11. All of the necessary findings regarding Defendant's financial status, improper distributions, and violations of the charging orders have already been made by the bankruptcy court. The only thing that remains for this Court to decide is whether sanctions are appropriate, which the Court finds they are, and the scope of those sanctions.

IV. SANCTIONS

Having determined that Campbell is in contempt of court, the Court now determines what sanctions are appropriate, keeping in mind that this Court has broad discretion in fashioning sanctions, "measured solely by the 'requirements of full remedial relief.' " United States v. City of Miami, 195 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Citronelle–Mobile Gathering, 943 F.2d at 1304. Sanctions in civil contempt proceedings "may be imposed for either or both of two distinct purposes, to coerce compliance with a court order, and to compensate the complainant for actual losses sustained by him as the result of the defendants' contumacy. ... If the fine is compensatory, it is payable to the complainant and must be based on proof of the complainant's actual loss." In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 872 F.2d 397, 400–01 (11th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). A district court has numerous options to coerce the contemnor to comply with a court order, "among them: a coercive daily fine, a compensatory fine, attorney's fees and expenses ..., and coercive incarceration." Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, 943 F.3d at 1304.

In this case, Radiance has been damaged in the amounts of what Campbell should have paid to Radiance had Campbell obeyed the Charging Orders. Radiance has submitted evidence that the amounts Campbell has distributed to himself or third parties is no less than approximately $725,995.45. Doc. 110. However, Radiance has stipulated, and this Court agrees, that the amount is capped by the Charging Orders at the existing judgment balance and post-judgment interest thereon. As no amounts have been paid towards the Charging Order liens by Campbell, or by any other means, the compensatory fine Campbell is liable for is $317,135.00, and the accrued interest thereon, which as of April 24, 2026, is $5,993.00, and such additional interest as will accrue at a per diem of $1.30 fn2 until Campbell purges himself of contempt. The Court finds that Campbell must purge himself of contempt by payment to Radiance the amount of $323,128.00, and such additional interest that may accrue until the date he purges himself of contempt.

fn2. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 governs civil judgment interest on federal judgments, calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding. The post-judgment interest rate for Radiance's judgment is thus 0.11%. The per diem is $1.30 ($317,135.00 x 0.11/365). From the date of the judgment to the hearing date (9/9/2013 to 3/25/2026=4,580 days) the accrued interest was $5,954.00.

PAGE__5

The Court also finds that an award to Radiance may be appropriate as to necessary attorney's fees and costs it has incurred in this matter, commencing from the date Radiance discovered the Charging Order violations. In support of this fee award, Radiance is instructed to file a fee petition and affidavit within seven (7) days of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order. Additionally, Radiance is instructed to address whether it is for this Court or the Bankruptcy Court to determine whether and what amount of fees and costs may be appropriate. More details on the interplay between the bankruptcy proceedings and this proceeding are discussed in the next section.

V. BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS

The Court further notes that Defendant appears to raise a claim of impecunity. The Court rejects Campbell's attempted claim of impecunity. The Court further notes that its purpose in entering this order is only to determine the appropriate amount of sanctions. Campbell's impecunity is the subject of the bankruptcy court, who will determine whether assets are available to pay the amount owed to Radiance.

However, the law on an inability to pay defense is clear. The party seeking the contempt citation retains the ultimate burden of proof, but once a prima facie case is made, the burden of production shifts to the alleged contemnor, who must then come forward with evidence to show a present inability to comply that goes "beyond a mere assertion of inability and satisf[ies] his burden of production on the point by introducing evidence in support of his claim." Combs v. Ryan's Coal Co., Inc., 785 F.2d 970, 984 (11th Cir. 1986); see also S.E.C. v. Solow, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2010), aff'd, 396 F. App'x 635 (11th Cir. 2010) ("once the moving party makes a prima facie showing that the court order was violated, the burden of production shifts to the alleged contemnor to show a "present inability to comply that goes 'beyond a mere assertion of inability....' "). In Combs, the Eleventh Circuit held as follows:

Nor was there error in the district court's determination that appellants failed to meet their burden of production. The financial records they submitted were seriously inadequate. The income statements were unverified and based on the representations of Simmons, rather than on independent audits. Asset valuations were found to be significantly understated. Financial records were generally incomplete and did not include current statements or tax returns. It may be that Simmons and Alan's in fact lack the present ability to pay the obligation of Ryan's. But their failure to make all reasonable efforts to demonstrate that fact for the court means they were properly held in contempt.

Combs, 785 F.2d at 984. Similarly, in S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 112 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D.C. 2000), aff'd, 75 F. App'x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (unpublished), the Court noted as follows:

Bilzerian cannot avoid a finding of contempt merely by showing that he is unable to pay the entire $62 million judgment at this time. Inability to comply is only a complete defense if he cannot pay any of the judgment; otherwise, he must pay what he can. See SEC v. Musella, 818 F.Supp. 600, 602 (S.D.N.Y.1993). See also Loftus, 8 F.Supp.2d at 468 ("[U]nless a party is completely unable to comply with the Court's Order's [sic ] due to poverty, he must comply to the extent that his finances allow him.").

Bilzerian, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 17. Campbell's financial affidavit filed with the Court (Doc. 111), lacks any corroborating documentation, and is thus insufficient to demonstrate to this Court that he has an inability to pay a compensatory contempt fine. Additionally, in his documents filed in response to the contempt motion, Campbell filed a personal financial statement as of August 21, 2022 which lists assets and companies with assets that are omitted from his financial affidavit filed with the Court. See Doc. 102-27.

PAGE__6

In this case, Campbell filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy and currently has an active bankruptcy case. The only reason the Court is ruling on the instant motion is because the bankruptcy court lifted the mandatory stay so that this Court could determine the monetary amount—if any—owed to Radiance by Campbell. Given that Campbell is in bankruptcy, this Court does not believe that it had the authority to impose a deadline for payment or otherwise threaten further contempt, as the distribution of Campbell's assets is for the bankruptcy court to determine. Given this unique procedural posture, the Court determines only the appropriate amount of sanctions owed to Radiance. The Court will also proceed with briefing on an attorney fee award determination. However, as discussed previously, the parties shall be instructed to address the jurisdictional interplay between the limited lift of the bankruptcy stay and whether: (1) attorneys' fees would be encompassed in that matter and to what extent – i.e. the undersigned would only likely have the authority to review the attorneys' fees specifically incurred here and not those related to the adversarial bankruptcy proceeding and (2) whether this Court even has the authority to address attorneys' fees and costs under the limited lifting of the bankruptcy stay.

Unless otherwise indicated by the Bankruptcy Court, this Court intends to enter this as a final order and refer the issue back to the Bankruptcy Court for further enforcement in accordance with the bankruptcy stay and other bankruptcy law as it relates to the order of distribution of assets.

VI. CONCLUSION

Given Campbell's failure to comply with this Court's Charging Orders, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) Radiance's motion for sanctions (Doc. 65) is GRANTED;

(2) Campbell is held in civil contempt of court for his disregard of the charging orders;

(3) Campbell shall purge himself of contempt by paying Radiance $323,089.00, and such additional interest as has accrued from the date of March 25, 2026, to the date of his purge; and

(4) This matter is sent back to the bankruptcy case (23-35668) in the Southern District of New York for any further enforcement and payment of the sanctions award.

Radiance shall file its application for attorneys' fees and costs with jurisdictional analysis and the appropriate supporting documentation by May 5, 2026. Defendant Campbell shall have until May 12, 2026 to file any response to the application for attorneys' fees and costs.

Finally, Plaintiff's motion to strike the financial affidavit (Doc. 109) is DENIED as moot and Defendant's motion to file an objection to the proposed order and supplement (Docs. 115, 116) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Defendant's motion is granted to the extent the Court considered it, but otherwise denied.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York for case number 23-35668.

DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 2026.

Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve LLC v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 2026 WL 84544 (Bk.S.D.N.Y., Jan. 12, 2026).

Related Article: None.

AI Synopsis

Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve LLC v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 2026 WL 84544 (Bk.S.D.N.Y., Jan. 12, 2026).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER (I) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (II) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (III) MODIFYING THE AUTOMATIC STAY TO ALLOW PROSECUTION OF THE SANCTIONS MOTION

INTRODUCTION

JURISDICTION

BACKGROUND fn5

A. The Alabama Action and the Charging Orders

B. Transfers From the LLCs

1. The Transferors

a. Whigham Place

b. Antilles GP

2. The Transferees and the Transfers at Issue

a. Transfers to the Debtor

b. Transfers to Clairise Court

c. Transfers to WB Property

d. Transfer to Able Builders

e. Transfer to Marina Campbell

f. Transfers to JP Morgan

C. Pre-2018 Transfers

D. The Sanctions Motion and the Bankruptcy Filing

E. This Adversary Proceeding

DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

B. Exceptions to Discharge Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)

C. Count I – "Actual Fraud" Exception Under Section 523(a)(2)(A)

D. Count II – "Willful and Malicious" Exception Under Section 523(a)(6)

E. Count III – Declaratory Judgment

CONCLUSION AND ORDER fn24

Campbell v. Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve LLC (In re Campbell), 2026 WL 1146587 (S.D.N.Y., April 28, 2026).

OPINION & ORDER

BACKGROUND

STANDARD OF REVIEW

ANALYSIS

I. Timeliness of Appeal

II. Service of Motion

CONCLUSION

Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve LLC v. Campbell, 2026 WL 1147610 (S.D.Ala., April 28, 2026).

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. BACKGROUND

II. LAW GENERALLY

III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

IV. SANCTIONS

V. BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS

VI. CONCLUSION